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569 
SOCIAL RIGHTS, JUDICIAL 
REMEDIES AND THE POOR 
OCTÁVIO LUIZ MOTTA FERRAZ * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing legal recognition of rights to health, education, and 
housing, often referred collectively as “welfare rights,” “social and 
economic rights,” or simply “social rights” as I shall refer to them in this 
piece, has generated heated debates on several interrelated questions. Are 
these rights of the same nature as other human rights such as freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion, freedom from torture, and fair trial, often 
collectively named “civil and political rights?” Should social rights be 
judicially enforced in exactly the same manner as civil and political rights? 
Who actually benefits when courts decide to enforce social rights 
assertively, the poor or the better-off? 
To repeat, these are interrelated questions. The nature of a right will 
influence the manner in which courts should enforce it or if they should 
enforce it at all. And the manner in which a court enforces a particular 
right, i.e., the type of remedy it chooses, may in turn have a significant 
bearing on who actually benefits from the right.  
To illustrate, those who believe that social rights are different in nature 
from civil and political rights tend to defend a less assertive role for courts 
when adjudicating them, or no role at all.1 This may in part be explained 
by a belief that, should courts use traditional rights protecting remedies, 
such as individualized injunctions, they might end up benefiting the 
“wrong” individuals, i.e., the better-off.2 On the other hand, those who 
believe that social rights and civil and political rights are identical in 
nature often, though not always, also believe that courts should therefore 
make no difference among them regarding enforcement.3  
These debates are far from being purely academic, as they once were 
when social rights had been recognized in only a handful of constitutions 
 
 
 *      King’s College London  
1  See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 221 (2001); 
MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS 
IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227, 264 (2008).  
2  David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189, 191, 202 
(2012). 
3  See, e.g., David Bilchitz, Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and Its 
Importance, 119 S. AFR. L.J. 484 (2002).   
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and the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)4 had been ratified by a dozen or so countries.5 
With the increasing ratification of the ICESCR and other international law 
instruments that include social rights6  and the explosion in the number of 
national constitutions that include these rights, 7 these debates have 
become more prominent and consequential. The debates left the 
constraints of academic circles and became the daily preoccupation of 
constitutional courts across the world, and, though less often, of 
international adjudicative bodies at the UN and regional human rights’ 
systems, such as those of Europe and Inter-America.8  
My aim in this short commentary piece is not to describe and engage in 
detail with the several complex aspects of the important debates that flow 
from each of the questions above.9 Rather, I will focus on a specific aspect 
that has been the subject of renewed attention more recently: the issue of 
the distributive impact of judicial enforcement of social rights and its 
relationship with the type of remedy employed by courts when enforcing 
these rights.  
It has become increasingly clear in the experience of some countries 
that social rights’ judicial enforcement can often disproportionately benefit 
middle and upper classes rather than the poor. Some authors, such as 
 
 
4   International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
5  See e.g., E.W. Vierdag, The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 69 (1978). 
6  See e.g., United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S 
3; United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
7 As a comprehensive empirical study has found “[n]early all new democracies, and several 
established ones, have included some form of ESRs in their constitution . . . .” Courtney Jung, Ran 
Hirschl & Evan Rosevear, Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 
1043, 1045 (2014). 
8  One good example among many others of the concerns raised for judges by social rights’ 
adjudication was the inclusion of a whole panel dedicated to these rights in the annual conference of 
the Colombian Constitutional Court held on January 24 2019. See XIII Encuentro de la Jurisdicción 
Constitucional, la Corte Constitucional en perspectiva global, CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL, 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/noticia.php?XIII-Encuentro-de-la-Jurisdiccion-Constitucional,-
la-Corte-Constitucional-en-perspectiva-global-8684 (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
9  I have discussed some of these issues in more detail elsewhere. See e.g., Octavio Luiz Motta 
Ferraz, Harming the Poor Through Social Rights Litigation: Lessons from Brazil, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
1643, 1661 (2011); Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Health Inequalities, Rights, and Courts: The Social 
Impact of the “Judicialization of Health” in Brazil, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS 
BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? 76, 87–88 (Alicia Ely Yamin & Siri Gloppen eds., 2011); Octavio 
Luiz Motta Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?, 11 
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 33 (2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/6
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David Landau10 and Pedro Felipe de Oliveira Santos11 have suggested that 
this is determined, in great part, by the type of remedies used by courts.  
If this is true, and assuming this is even a problem,12 the solution would 
logically lie at the remedial stage; that is, courts should adopt whatever 
remedies are most suited to achieve the desired result of benefiting the 
poor rather than the middle and upper classes. I want to suggest in this 
piece that the regressive effects of social rights litigation seem to me less 
related to the type of remedy than to the interpretation of social rights 
adopted by courts.  
II. THE ARGUMENT ABOUT REMEDIES 
As I mentioned in the previous section, the perceived problem we are 
focusing on here is the finding of a mounting number of empirical studies 
that social rights litigation often does not benefit those whom they are 
supposed to benefit, i.e., the poor. Here is how David Landau aptly 
describes it: 
there is a basic disconnect between the theoretical claims being 
made about the enforcement of social rights and the empirical 
realities of their enforcement. In the theoretical literature, scholars 
equate a robust enforcement of social rights with the advancement 
of the prospects of marginalized groups—by ensuring that citizens 
have minimum levels of things like food and shelter, the courts will 
improve the lot of the poorest members of society. Yet much of 
social rights enforcement is aimed not at the poor, but instead at 
middle- and upper-class groups. When courts in the developing 
world prevent pension reforms or salary cuts that would affect civil 
 
 
10  Landau, supra note 2. 
11  Pedro Felipe de Oliveira Santos, Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation: Designing Judicial 
Review to Control the Mis-Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights, 18 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 593 (2019). 
12  It should be stressed that not everyone believes this is a problem. Many believe that social 
rights, as universal human rights, should benefit everyone, including the rich. For them, the problem is 
not that middle and upper classes are overrepresented in successful social rights litigation, but rather 
that the poor are underrepresented. For them, the solution is therefore not to limit access to litigation to 
the middle and upper classes, but rather to expand access to litigation to the poor. For reasons I cannot 
develop in much detail here I believe this position is problematic. Its main flaw is to overlook that 
social rights, and many civil and political rights as well, are dependent on finite resources and require, 
therefore, the prioritization of certain groups. In my view the poor, who are often the most deprived of 
social rights, should receive priority in the allocation of scarce state resources, especially in less 
developed and unequal societies. See Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts of 
Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?, supra note 10. 
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servants, when they order the state to give an expensive medical 
treatment or pay a pension to a middle-class professional, or when 
they force the state to raise subsidies for homeownership, they are 
deciding cases that help mainstream rather than marginalized 
groups.13  
There is, of course, disagreement about these findings.14 Some reject 
them altogether;15 others claim more plausibly that a relatively small 
number of the poor do benefit directly from judicial intervention and may 
also benefit indirectly from litigation driven by the middle and upper 
classes if and when–and these are important conditions–the government 
decides to change its policy and universalize the benefits granted by 
courts.16  
Again, this is a large debate which I will not be able to engage with any 
further here. Following Landau, I will simply focus on the less 
controversial point that, in many places, it seems clear from empirical 
studies that social rights litigation is not having the transformative impact 
on the lives of the poor it is supposed to have. The important questions, 
once this is acknowledged, are why and how could this be changed?  
For Landau, and Santos who seems to agree with him, both answers are 
to be found, in great part, in the remedies used by courts. To cite Landau 
again, “courts are likely to choose certain remedies [individualized 
remedies and negative injunctions] because of ideology and resource 
constraints and these remedies are particularly ineffective at targeting 
lower class groups.”17 As a consequence, he argues, we are in need of 
“remedial innovation,” i.e., “more aggressive, unconventional enforcement 
strategies—especially the judicious use of structural injunctions [which] 
can more effectively target social rights’ interventions towards the poor.”18 
 
 
13  Landau, supra note 2, at 191. 
14  Santos himself in this volume, although seemingly in agreement that some social rights 
litigation does not benefit the most disadvantaged (what he calls mis-enforcement), claims that “a 
broad range of rulings all over the country ordered the government to materialize constitutional 
promises, not only on the right to health, but on all other socio-economic rights: construction of 
schools and hospitals in poor villages, instatement of social security benefits, and installation of 
electricity in rural areas, among others.” Santos, supra note 12, at 526. It is unfortunate he does not 
provide any supporting empirical evidence and references of this type of “progressive litigation” so it 
can be contrasted in terms of volume and impact to the empirical evidence of “regressive litigation.”  
15  This is not a view supported by the available empirical data in my opinion. 
16 See generally Daniel Brinks & William Forbath, Commentary: Social and Economic Rights 
in Latin America: Constitutional Courts and the Prospects for Pro-Poor Interventions, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 1943, 1952-53 (2011).  
17  Landau, supra note 2, at 191.  
18  Id. at 192. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/6
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Santos seems to follow Landau in his piece in this volume: “The Brazilian 
data fit Landau’s classification, in the sense that achieving structural 
enforcement seems to be the most effective way to incentivize government 
to improve services and to target low-income groups. Eventually, 
institutional innovation should be set to reduce individualized claims and 
increase the collective claims.”19 
I disagree with Landau and Santos and will explain why in the next 
section of this piece, using the example of right to health litigation in 
Brazil that both authors also use in their articles.  
III. THE REAL PROBLEM: INTERPRETATION 
My argument can be summarized as follows. Although the form of 
legal remedies may have implications on the types of people ultimately 
benefited, this is not a very important, let alone the most important, 
determinant of what we may call “regressive judicialization,” i.e., 
judicialization that disproportionately serves the interests of the middle 
and upper classes vis-à-vis the poor.   
To develop the argument in a more concrete manner, I will use the 
example of right to health litigation in Brazil, which has been one of my 
main areas of research in the past decade. Take drugs for diabetes, the 
current “champion” of health judicialization in the state of São Paulo, the 
largest state in terms of population, with more than 40 million inhabitants, 
and one of the richest in Brazil. 
Diabetes is a very debilitating disease, affecting millions in the 
population and correctly identified as a priority of the Ministry of Health 
in Brazil. Although it presents a socio-economic gradient as most health 
issues do, it is a condition that affects individuals from all socio-economic 
classes. Comprehensive and detailed data on the judicialization of health 
in the state of São Paulo show that there are tens of thousands of 
successful individualized lawsuits against that state every year claiming 
diabetes drugs, and also that a large portion of these lawsuits do not 
benefit the poor.20 This scenario seems to provide the perfect example of 
 
 
19  Santos, supra note 12, at 546.  
20  See Fabiola Sulpino Vieira & Paola Zucchi, Distorções causadas pelas ações judiciais à 
política de medicamentos no Brasil [Distortions to National Drug Policy Caused by Lawsuits in 
Brazil], 41 REVISTA DE SAÚDE PÚBLICA 214 (2007); Ana Luiza Chieffi & Rita Barradas Barata, 
Judicialização da política pública de assistência farmacêutica e eqüidade [Judicialization of Public 
Health Policy for Distribution of Medicines], 25 CADERNOS DE SAÚDE PÚBLICA 1839 (2009); Daniel 
W. Liang Wang & Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz, Reaching Out to the Needy? Access to Justice and 
Public Attorneys’ Role in Right to Health Litigation in the City of São Paulo, 10 SUR INT’L J. HUM. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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what Landau calls the “empirical realities” of social rights enforcement 
and what Santos terms “mis-enforcement,” a reality that may be corrected, 
according to their arguments, by a change in the type of remedy used by 
courts, i.e., by a reliance on structural (collective) remedies rather than the 
current individualized remedies prevalent in health litigation in São Paulo.  
This is far from plausible in my view. It not only overstates the 
potential capacity of structural litigation to succeed in the aim of 
benefiting the poor in social rights litigation, which is actually to some 
extent admitted by Landau from the outset of his article,21 it also 
incorrectly assumes that a strong relationship exists between the type of 
remedy (individualized or structural), potential beneficiaries (poor, middle, 
or upper classes) and social rights implementation that does not actually 
obtain. I will focus on these latter problems as, unlike the former, they 
seem to be overlooked by both Landau and Santos. 
Let me start with the first relationship assumed in the argument. 
Individualized claims tend to benefit the middle and upper classes and 
structural injunctions tend to benefit the poor.22 It is true that under certain 
conditions that seem to prevail in many countries individualized litigation 
tends to favor mostly better-off people, who have the resources, both 
material (i.e., money to pay lawyers and costs) and intellectual (knowledge 
of rights and confidence to litigate), that are required to pursue the judicial 
strategy.23 Some initiatives aimed at widening access to justice may help 
diminish the material barriers (for example, legal aid, public defenders, 
“epistolary jurisdiction,” etc.) but none of them seems to be sufficient to 
completely bridge the gap between rich and poor in their relative ability to 
use litigation as a tool to further their interests. Given such barriers, it 
seems plausible that the poor are more likely to benefit from litigation that 
 
 
RTS. 159 (2013). 
21  “The conclusion is not that structural injunctions are the right answer to all social rights 
problems; they will fail in many political contexts, and the resource costs that they will place on courts 
may be too high to pay in many circumstances. It is that there is a desperate need to innovate with 
aggressive remedies if social rights are to live up to their transformative promise.” Landau, supra note 
2, at 192. 
22  “I use a case study to test my two major hypotheses: (a) that much of social rights 
enforcement is majoritarian and benefits middle and upper class groups, and (b) that there is a strong 
relationship between the type of remedy used by courts and the identity of the beneficiaries from the 
intervention.” Landau, supra note 2, at 202. 
23  In the social sciences literature this is often discussed in terms of the “support structure” or 
structural opportunity for litigation. See e.g., CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, 
ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3 (1998); Siri Gloppen, Courts and 
Social Transformation: An Analytical Framework, in COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW 
DEMOCRACIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? 35 (Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo, & 
Theunis Roux eds., 2006).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/6
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they are not required to initiate but that still targets the advancement of 
their interests. This conclusion, however, does not necessarily point 
towards structural litigation. Both individualized and structural litigation, 
and other forms of remedies,24 may benefit the poor so long as they target, 
as I have just mentioned, the poor’s interests. This targeting of the poor’s 
interests, not the type of remedy, is in my view the most important 
necessary condition. The type of remedy is not even a necessary condition; 
it is a contingent factor that may or may not favor the poor. What 
disadvantages the poor in comparison to the rich is their much lower 
opportunity to use litigation –to start and sustain it–as a strategy to pursue 
their interests. They have to rely on others to litigate on their behalf, either 
better-off individuals with identical interests who litigate individually,25 or 
actors with standing to bring collective-structural suits on issues that affect 
the poor.26  
The likelihood of the latter happening is perhaps higher in certain 
contexts, but this is a contingent and contextual factor which is difficult to 
establish in the abstract. Landau uses two Colombian examples of 
structural litigation that have targeted interests of the poor (the displaced 
persons and the healthcare cases), another case from India on the right to 
food, and the classic school desegregation and prison reform cases in the 
USA. 27 But this is perhaps too small a sample from which to derive 
broader conclusions. We can surely imagine structural litigation that 
focuses on issues that do not primarily affect the poor. An interesting 
study carried out in Brazil about the structural/collective remedies 
available in the legal system (The Civil Public Action, The Popular 
Action, and the Collective Security Injunction) found that a large portion 
of cases involved social security benefits and salary increments for civil 
servants, which are not exactly the interests of the poor.28 I do not disagree 
with Landau that structural-collective remedies have perhaps a greater 
 
 
24  It is important to clarify that I am not inadvertently (and incorrectly) assuming that there are 
only two types of remedies, individualized and structural claims. This is a simplification to make the 
argument more manageable in the limited space of this short piece.   
25  In this case a further condition needs to obtain, namely that the system is one where 
individualized remedies have erga omnes effects (as in most common law jurisdictions).  
26  For example, NGOs, public prosecutors, public defenders, etc. 
27  Landau, supra note 2, at 236. In the India case, People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of 
India, (2003) 2 SCR 1136, an Indian NGO challenged the federal government’s grain distribution 
policy, arguing it violated the constitutional right to be free from hunger.  
28  Landau also talks about these types of suits in Colombia, but, as they were negative 
injunctions, he places them alongside individualized claims that tend to benefit the better-off. The fact 
that they were negative injunctions is in my view contingent. They could easily have been 
collective/structural actions, as was the case in Brazil.   
Washington University Open Scholarship
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potential when judiciously used (an important but also too broad a caveat) 
to benefit the poor. But this contingent connection between structural-
collective litigation and the poor seems much weaker than that between 
individualized litigation and the middle and upper classes.   
The diabetes treatment case mentioned above also illustrate the other 
problematic assumption in Landau and Santos’ argument. In addition to 
the tens of thousands of successful individualized lawsuits claiming 
diabetes drugs,  a structural lawsuit that claims exactly the same benefits 
(diabetes treatment), but through a structural remedy (a Public Civil 
Action) brought against the state, is also pending.29 If successful, the 
treatment requested, currently accessible only to the tens of thousands 
better-off litigants who have brought individualized claims against the 
state, would in principle be extended to everyone, rich and poor, who 
suffers from diabetes. Again, this seems to be the exact solution that 
Landau and Santos are arguing for and, at first sight, seems intuitively 
correct. If social rights are supposed to benefit everyone equally, and 
primarily the poor who tend to be in worse health conditions than the 
better-off, this structural action seems to be the solution, given that 
diabetes affects hundreds of thousands of poor people who find it harder to 
use individualized litigation to pursue their interests.  
On reflection, however, it is not that simple. The intuition implies that 
the right to health of article 196 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution30 and of 
article 12 of the ICESCR,31 which Brazil ratified in 1991,32 should include 
the treatment for diabetes claimed in the structural action of the Public 
Defensory. Yet this is far from obvious. That the right to health imposes a 
duty on the state of São Paulo to have a public policy to deal with diabetes 
seems very plausible. What exact policy it should have and what precise 
 
 
29  Press Release, Rede Nacional de Pessoas com Diabetes [National Network of People with 
Diabetes], Ação Civil Pública - Defensoria Pública [Public Civil Action - Public Defender's Office], 
http://www.rnpd.org.br/site/internas.asp?area=61&id=75 (last visisted Feb. 20, 2019). The number of 
the case provided is  Processo nº 83/053.05.001305-2 13ª Vara da Fazenda Pública de São Paulo, 
Brazil. Id. Unfortunately, the decision and petitions of this strucutural injunction cannot be accessed 
via court websites.  
30  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 196 (“Health is the right of all and the 
duty of the National Government and shall be guaranteed by social and economic policies aimed at 
reducing the risk of illness and other maladies and by universal and equal access to all activities and 
services for its promotion, protection and recovery.”). 
31  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 4, art. 12(1) 
(“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”).  
32  See Depositary: Status of Treaties, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2019).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/6
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treatment it should offer is another question which, many reasonably 
argue, courts should not in principle determine themselves.33  
Moreover, things are even more complicated as the choice is not a 
simple one between treatment and no treatment, as one may automatically 
assume any right to health litigation is about. In many right to health cases, 
including those regarding diabetes, the dispute is rather about what 
treatment, among several options, the state ought to provide to citizens in 
light of its constitutional duty to implement the right to health. In this case, 
as in many others, the state of São Paulo had a policy in place to provide 
the standard diabetes treatment, accepted as effective worldwide, which 
includes the administration to the patient of the standard kind of insulin 
(human or animal). However, a new kind of insulin, called analogue 
insulin, was developed by giant pharmaceutical companies like Ely Lilly, 
Novo Nordisk,  and Sanofi-Aventis, who marketed it aggressively to the 
public as providing much better and easier control of diabetes than the 
standard treatment.34 The cost of the drug, however, is unsurprisingly far 
higher than the standard treatment. 
The vast majority of the tens of thousands individualized right to health 
lawsuits claiming diabetes treatment against the state of São Paulo seeks 
this newer, more expensive type of insulin instead of the standard 
treatment already offered by the state. It is even more doubtful, I would 
suggest, that the right to health requires the state to provide any specific 
treatment available in the market for any health condition, irrespective of 
its costs and independent of whether alternative, effective, and cheaper 
options exist. In this particular case of analogue insulins, the World Health 
Organization’s 18th Expert Committee on the Selection and Use of 
Essential Medicines had this to say in their Review of the Evidence 
Comparing Insulin (Human or Animal) with Analogue Insulins: 
The new data did not alter the conclusions of the Singh et al (2009) 
review, which indicated that analogue insulins had little advantage 
over conventional insulins in terms of glycaemic control or reduced 
hypoglycaemia. Statistically significant advantages associated with 
analogues are generally less than clinically important minimal 
differences, and advantages for occurrence of hypoglycaemia are 
 
 
33  Santos himself seems to agree with this position: “Defining exactly what the public services 
must cover–in other terms, specifically defining the core of the needs, the beneficiaries, and the 
priorities that the state should provide–is not the constitutionally appropriate function of the judicial 
branch.” Santos, supra note 12, at 548.  
34  See C. Girish et al., Newer Insulin Analogues and Inhaled Insulin, 60 INDIAN J. MED. SCI. 
117 (2006). 
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not consistent across comparisons. Recent health technology 
assessments in the UK and Germany indicated no advantage for 
long-acting analogue insulins in Type 1 and 2 diabetes. . . . Reviews 
of analogue use and cancer risk indicate increased cancer risk in 
some analyses and no difference with human insulins in other 
analyses . . . .35  
It is beyond the scope of this piece to develop any further the argument 
on why the interpretation of the right to health by Brazilian courts in this 
individualized diabetes litigation is incorrect and produces pernicious 
effects.36 But the discussion above seems sufficient for the point I want to 
make here, namely that the type of remedy–individualized or structural 
claims–is not the most relevant determinant of whether social rights 
litigation will lead to positive and progressive effects. As my example of 
diabetes litigation in São Paulo, Brazil, shows (and I believe it can be 
extrapolated beyond that particular case), the mere transformation of those 
individualized remedies into a structural one would not have the 
progressive impact that Landau and Santos claim that structural remedies 
tend to have. Such a transformation would rather exponentially multiply 
the pernicious effects of those misguided individualized claims.  
What really matters, therefore, is not the type of remedy, but whether 
the courts interpret the right correctly, i.e., in a manner that imposes on the 
state a duty to provide citizens with access to healthcare that is equitable 
and cost-effective within the state’s available resources.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this short commentary piece my modest aim was to caution against 
the view that the increasingly recognized problem that social rights 
 
 
35  WORLD HEALTH ORG. 18TH EXPERT COMM. ON THE SELECTION & USE OF ESSENTIAL 
MEDS., REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE COMPARING INSULIN (HUMAN OR ANIMAL) WITH ANALOGUE 
INSULINS 4 (2011), 
https://www.who.int/selection_medicines/committees/expert/18/applications/Insulin_review.pdf. It is 
also important to note that the CONITEC, the Brazilian agency linked to the Ministry of Health that 
assesses all new technologies and makes recommendations about their incorporation in the public 
health system, has carried out no less than three assessments in the past few years and recommended 
that analogue insulins should not be incorporated on the same grounds as the WHO review. See 
generally Recomendações sobre as tecnologias avaliadas–2019 [Recommendations on Technologies 
Evaluated–2019], CONITEC (June 24, 2014),  http://conitec.gov.br/decisoes-sobre-incorporacoes (last 
updated Mar. 7, 2019).   
36  For the full argument, see my work cited supra, note 10, and also Benedict Rumbold, Rachel 
Baker, Octavio Ferraz et al., Universal Health Coverage, Priority Setting, and the Human Right to 
Health, 390 THE LANCET 712 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)30931-5. 
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litigation often does not help the poor may be addressed, or minimized, by 
remedial solutions, namely by encouraging courts to use innovative 
remedies such as structural injunctions. 
I made two main claims. Firstly, I argued that the causal link between 
structural injunctions and poor beneficiaries is not as strong as the link 
between individualized claims and middle- and upper-class ones. 
Structural injunctions have perhaps a greater potential to benefit the poor 
than individualized remedies, yet concrete results depend not only on 
defeating several important obstacles related to costs, implementation, etc., 
but also on the willingness of those with standing to bring structural 
injunctions to focus on issues that really affect the poor. As the example of 
Brazil shows, structural injunctions are often used to protect the interests 
of the middle and upper classes, such as civil servants’ social security 
benefits and salary increments. As the standing to bring structural cases is 
often restricted to a few actors, this is a limited resource that, when used in 
favor of the better-off, automatically diminishes the amount left to 
potentially benefit the poor. Secondly, and equally importantly but 
sometimes overlooked by those betting on structural injunctions, such 
injunctions can also be used to make misguided social rights claims as the 
example of diabetes treatment in the State of São Paulo shows. When this 
is the case, rather than leading to the positive and progressive effects 
desired by those betting on this remedial solution, structural injunctions 
would augment exponentially the negative (and often regressive) effects of 
individualized litigation. 
In my view, focusing on remedies, though important, will not be 
sufficient to address the problem of the negative and often regressive 
effects of social rights litigation. As is the case in medicine, if we do not 
first get the correct diagnosis, the remedy will likely be inefficient or even 
pernicious to the patient. Getting the correct diagnosis in social rights 
means interpreting these rights correctly, something that is still a difficult 
challenge for many courts around the world.                  
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